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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH
JOHX E. :JicX...\UGHTO~ and
HEXRIETT ...\ ~IcX ...\UGHTON,
Pla£ntijj's and Respondents,
-YS.-

JOH~

B. E ...\TON, et al.,
Defenda1lts and Appellants.

Respondents Brief
NATURE OF CASE
Respondents brought this suit to quiet title to water
which arises in the MeN a ugh ton Gulch between two specified points. The appellants claim the right to divert
water from the McNaughton Gulch at points downstream. This appeal was taken from a decree in favor
of the respondents.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Before turning to a detailed statement of the facts,
we set forth in general the basic contentions of the appellants and in general describe our answer thereto. It
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1.

is thought that this general statement of our respective
positions will be helpful to the court in reading the
statement of facts which follows immediately below. The
appellants make four basic contentions:
1. That they were deprived of a fair trial by the
fact that the trial court decided the case on the theory
that the waters in question were private waters.
The appellants had a fair trial. The pleadings claim
only general ownership of the water; the trial produced
evidence which would be immaterial if the theory of
prior appropriation were the only claim; the record
shows at page 201 that the plaintiff asserted ownership
of the water because it arose on his land, and counsel
for the plaintiff objected to the characterization of the
McNaughton Gulch as a water course. Nearly three full
months transpired after the· judge made his memorandum
decision, yet the appellants failed to produce a single
affidavit or to make any showing that there was addi-·
tional evidence which they could produce if given a
chance. They thus completely disregarded Rule 59, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure,· and have failed to show any
prejudice.
2. Appellants complain that the court erred in
failing to conclude that these waters were public waters
subject to public appropriation. We contend that the
court did not so err. Further, the court found as a matter
.of fact that the respondents under the doctrine of prior
appropriation, which appellants argue for, were prior
2
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in time and in right to the appellants. Therefore, had the
court concluded as a matter of la'Y that the 'vnters in
question 'Yere public 'Ynters, it 'vould have been compelled under its findings of fact to enter judgment for
respondents.
3. That the court's findings on all facts necessary
to sho'v a prior appropriation were immaterial and
should be disregarded here because the trial court could
haYe reached its present decision without making those
findings. The authorities hold that the Supreme Court
will not assume that the trial court made findings without having considered all the evidence. These findings
are therefore controlling in the event this court decides
that the \Vaters are subject to appropriation.
4. That the evidence does not support the various
findings of the trial court. We will make appropriate
record citations to show that the record amply supports
each challenged finding.

THE FACTS
The respondents have not even purported to give
a complete statement of the facts. It will, therefore, be
necessary for the respondents to do so. Found in the
very sketchy statement of facts set forth by the appellants are numerous misstatements. To take each misstatement and show wherein it disregards the record
would require a rather lengthy section in this brief and
yet would not present the facts in a logical order.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In addition to the numerous misstatements of the
record, appellants challenge the trial court's findings in
nine particulars. There are only 12 findings and it
seems to us that the best way to bring the facts to the
attention of this court is for us to quote the :findings, one
by one, and cite the record to support each of them.
THE FINDINGS
Finding Number One is a formal recital of the residence of the parties.
Number Two recites that additional parties were
added to the suit (R. 227-8).
Number Three is a recital that John McNaughton
is the owner of 80 acres of land. (This is supported by
R. 141 and ownership plat Exhibit B). It is then found
that the lands are by nature arid, but with irrigation
will produce crops. Carroll testified that for 50 years
McNaughtons have raised crops on these lands (R. 45);
MeN aughton testified that all the gulch water was necessary to irrigate the lands (R. 152. See also 101, 221, 29) ;
and that practically the entire 80 acres are irrigated ·
(R. 149).
Number Four: "That there is a natural depression
or wash which runs in a general Southeasterly direction
across the lands described; that said depression is commonly known as the MeN a ughton Gulch;'' (The location of the gulch is shown on a map (traced from aerial
photo) Exhibit A; and on Exhibit 1, (drawn to scale
4
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by an engineer), and the gulch is described by numerous

'Yitnt•sscs (See, for example, R. 40). The court continues :
· •that said gulch in its natural condition prior to 1885
"~as dry and no 'Yater flo,Yed therein;'' Gardner testified
at R. 4 that in 1883 the ~I eX a ughton Gulch 'vas "a dry
gulch." (See also R. 16). The court then found: "that
said gulch is intersected about one mile to the west of
the i\IrXaughton property by the Ashley Upper Canal,
(R. 40, and Exhibit .J._l), that said canal was constructed
in about 1885 (R. 4) and has been used since said date
to con,ey irrigation water for use .on lands adjacent to
and above the described gulch and on other lands;" (R.
11, 40, 158), ''that said gulch runs from the Ashley
Upper Canal Southeasterly through Section 20, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, S. L. B. & M., crosses the
highway to Maeser and enters the West 40 acre tract
of the McNaughton property" described above and goes
Southeasterly to Ashley Central Canal. (Plaintiff's
Exhibit A, which was stipulated to be a tracing from an
aerial photograph, shows the location of the gulch and
the two canals referred to in the finding. Defendant's
Exhibit 1 prepared by a licensed engineer shows the
same general area drawn to scale.)
Finding Number Five: ''That there are lands lying
both to the North and to the South of the MeN aughton
Gulch which are irrigated from the Ashley Upper Canal;
that the natural slope of said lands is toward the gulch
(R. 40, 261); that through the irrigation of these adjacent lands seepage and waste waters find their way by
percolation, seepage and surface run-off to the MeN a ugh5
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ton Gulch.'' Carroll testified at Page 41 of transcript
that:
"I have seen seepage water in the gulch; it
is according to the year. Dry years there would
be no water at all between the Carroll diversion
(McNaughton's first diversion point) and the
canal; wet years there would be seepage water
between those points.''
At Pag~ 40, Carroll said that slope of the lands on
I
each side of the gulch is toward the gulch ; the lands on
each side are irrigated from the Ashley Upper Canal.
At Page 52 he was asked:

'' Q. Do the upper irrigators permit their
waste water to run into the gulch~
. "
A . Y es, s1r.
John McNaughton testified on this point at Page

158:
"It (variation of water in the gulch) is caused
by the amount of irrigation on each· side of the
gulch; that is one of the causes. And, of course,
from the use of the water by the neighbors above.
Sometimes they are not so careful about their
water, they let it run through, and return waste
water, so the gulch fluctuates from waste water
as well as the seepage water."
John Gardner testified at Page 16:
That in 1886 the gulch was dry above the
Carroll dam except for water from the canal.

'' Q. But if they shut the water off at the
canal, would water come into the gulch anyway~
A. There was no water coming into the
gulch ; there was no land farmed above there.''
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Of course Gardner \Yns tPstifying concerning conditions baek in lSSG and the remark that there was no
"Tater in the gulch exeept canal \Yater because there were
no lands being irrigated along the gulch is important in
supporting the court's conclusion that the water in the
gulch had its origin in upper irrigation.
The defendants also called an engineer who prepared Exhibit 1 and \Yho checked the ground rather
carefully. He testified at Page 261 that the slope of the
land is to,Yard the gulch and at Page 260 that water
was running into the gulch as surface run-off from upper
irrigation. There is other like evidence from other witnesses, but the above certainly would support the challenged finding.
The court in finding Number Five proceeds: "that
the amount of water thus finding its way into the MeN aughton Gulch varies from day to day and from season
to season, depending upon the irrigation practices prevailing on these adjacent lands." Appellants say (Page
29) that the court ''will look in vain'' for any evidence
to support this finding. Two witnesses testified in accordance \Yith the court's finding in almost the words
used by the court. Carroll testified at Page 52 :
'' Q. Is the amount which flows therein consistent from day to day, and season to season~

A.
Q.

Varies all the time.
Does it vary day to day in the same

season~

A. Yes, because we have irrigation on each
side, and sometimes the waste water runs in and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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it will raise, and the next day somebody shuts
their water off and there won't be as much in
there.
Q. Do the upper irrigators permit their waste
water to run into the gulch'
. ''
A . Y es, s1r.
John McNaughton testified (R. 158):
"Well, I have observed the gulch for all these
years, and I find that the gulch fluctuates from
year to year and day to day, and it is pretty hard
to tell just how much water you are going to
have, ...
Q. Do you know what causes it to fluctuate
from day to day'
A. It is caused by the amount of irrigation
on each side of the gulch; that is one of the causes.
And, of course, from the use of the water by the
neighbors above. Sometimes they are not so
careful about their water, they let it run through
and return waste water, so the gulch fluctuates
from waste water as well as the seepage water."
The court in finding Number Five proceeds: ''that
the amount of water available for diversion from the
gulch on to the McNaughton lands is not measureable;
(Carroll so testified, R. 53, 55) that in 1885 the amount
of land surrounding the MeN aughton Gulch which was
being irrigated was not sufficient to produce any sho,ving of drainage water from that source, either surface
or subterranean, in the McNaughton Gulch. (Gardner
so testified, R. 16) that in 1886 seepage waters began to
appear in the McNaughton Gulch and a dam was constructed in that year. in the McNaughton Gulch by the
predecessors in interest of the plaintiff, (and others
8
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''"hose identity is not material to this litigation) in Section :20, Range ~1 East, Township 4 South, SLB&M, at
a point located on properties no'v owned by Roy Carroll,
and located in said gulch about 500 yards west of the
aforementioned road to :Thiaeser.'' Gardner so testified
(R. 5; See also Exhibit .A.) "that the \Yater was diverted
at said point into an artificial ditch which is now commonly called the 'middle ditch' across the Carroll property to the plaintiffs' land ·and the land of others; that
said dam has been continuously used and water has been
di,erted at said point from 1886 to the present time for
the irrigation of the lands of the plaintiff John E. MeNa ughton described above.'' Several witnesses so testified: Gardner, R. 6, 7 ; Carroll, remembers use of Carroll di,ersion for 52 years, R. 42; McNaughton, 159).
Finding Number Six: ''The volume of seepage or
waste water flowing into the McNaughton Gulch has increased with the increased irrigation (Rudy so testified,
R. 234) within its drainage area, until at the high point
of flow there may be several cubic feet per second flowing
in the gulch (R. 71), but the flow is not constant (R. 52,
171) and the amount at its lowest ebb is of a negligible
amount (R. 152, 157). At least at one time the gulch
was known to dry up completely during the non-irrigation season; that the seepage water since its first showing
has oozed into the sides and the bottom of the gulch
throughout its length, but in a number of places along
its sides and below the general surface of the ground
as the flow has increased it has collected into little channels which have the appearance of springs which flow
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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varying amounts of water. The so-called springs have
the same characteristics as the ooze in response to the
flow of the irrigating water upon the surface of the lands
surrounding the gulch, and all of the water thus finding
its way into the McNaughton Gulch has its origin originally in the Ashley Upper Canal, which secures its water
from natural sources many miles distant from the MeN a ugh ton Gulch.'' Carroll said that in dry years there
was no water at all at the Carroll diversion (R. 41 ).
Gardner said it was a dry gulch in 1885 (R. 4) ; that
there was little irrigation in 1886 and the gulch had
no water except that from the canal (R. 16); Rudy said
that the flow increased from year to year after he built
the Rudy Dam (R. 234). Lewis testified that the flow
in the gulch would come after they started irrigating
the farm lands above (R. 82). Carroll said that there
was not much water in the gulch after irrigation stops
(R. 56); that livestock owners took their livestock to
the Canal in the winter for water (R. 55). Frank Lee
said the gulch had seepage water and that there was
not much seepage in the winter time (R. 37). The
testimony of Carroll and McNaughton that the stream
1vas made up of seepage and irrigation waste water is
set forth above. In addition, see the testimony of
MeN a ugh ton at page 206 where he says the stream is
made up of drainage water and surface waste water.
MeN aughton said (R. 152, 157) that at times there is
not much water in the gulch, not enough to irrigate his
farm and he has to commingle canal water with it to
make up a stream.
10
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Finding Number Seven: ''That the canal waters
are turned dirertly from the Ashley Upper Canal ·into
the nlrXanghton Gulch at the point \Yhere said canal and
guleh intersect about one mile \Vest of plaintiff's laiH1~,
and are permitted to flow down said gulch to the aforementioned Carroll Dam, \Yhere they are diverted through
the middle ditch and on to the lands of the plaintiffs
and others ; (See R. 5, 42, 155, 154) that said diversions
from the . A. shley Upper Canal were made pursuant to
rights under stock owned by the MeN a ughtons and others
in the .A. shley Upper Canal Company (see R. 154) and
from 1886 (R. 5, 42) to the present time the waters which
have seeped in the MeN a ughton Gulch above the Carroll
Dam have flowed down to the Carroll Dam sometimes
by themselYes and sometimes while commingled with
canal water being delivered to stockholders and have
been used by the plaintiffs and their predecessors and
others (whose names and identities are not material
herein) for the irrigation of the lands of the plaintiffs
described above, and of said other persons; that none
of the persons so using said waters were predecessors
in interest of any of the defendants (See R. 5).''
Finding Number Eight: ''That below the Carroll
Dam and above the plaintiffs' lands described above,
other waters accumulated in the McNaughton Gulch in
the manner above set forth; that in about 1895 the
plaintiffs' predecessors in interest constructed a tight
dam across the MeNa ugh ton Gulch near the Southeast
corner of plaintiffs' West 40 acre tract described above,
which dam impounded and diverted the waters accumuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lating in the McNaughton Gulch between said dam and
the Carroll Dam. (See Gardner's testimony that in 1896
when he was sixteen years old he went swimming in the
big pond formed by this dam and it had been in "a long
time before that" (R. 8, Rudy, R. 234.) Every other witness testifying on this point admitted that the dam had
been in from the date of his first memory. McNaughton
testified that he could remember since 1900 and the dam
was in then (R. 139-41). Carroll could remember the dam
for about 52 years or back to about 1897 or 98 (R. 42-3).
The only witness for defendants who was familiar with
the early history of this construction was on the MeN a ugh ton place in 1903. He said the dam was in then
( R. 88). There is no evidence to the contrary.
The court proceeds with the :finding: ''That the
plaintiffs' predecessors diverted water through one ditch
running to the South and another ditch running to the
North of said dam for the irrigation of the above described lands now owned by the plaintiffs.'' There is
some conflict in the evidence as to whether there was a
ditch to the North. Everyone admitted that there was a
ditch to the South (R. 44, 62, 74, 116, 140, 232). As to
the ditch to the North, the following witnesses testified
that it existed: Gardner, R. 8; Carroll, R. 44; Tysack,
R. 19; Merkley, R. 62; Lewis, R. 74; MeN a ughton, R. 140;
Rudy, R. 232. Other witnesses denied that the North
ditch was in prior to 1912 .. (See Hazel Hoeft, R. 113).
But she admits that the ditch to North was in by 1912
(R. 114); E. Hoeft was on McNaughton property once
when he was 8 years old (1903); he was running down
12
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Xorth side of big· dam and sn"y no ditch to the North (R.
89). He kne'v of diY(\rsion to South, ho,Yever (R. 89).
Hoeft admitted that by 1910 or 1911 he saw a ditch to
the Xorth (R. 89). Ross, "\Yho admitted that he had little
familiarity 'Yith ~IcXaughton place and in past 48 years
had never had an occasion to be on the place (R. 337)
although he owned lands now owned by defendants, said
that there was no ditch to the North (R. 321). The court
could probably haYe found that the ditch to the North
was not constructed until 1910-12, but certainly the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence is to the effect
that it was in prior to 1900.
The court then proceeds: "that said dam (MeN aughton Dam) consisted of a dirt fill.'' Everyone so
testified and also testified that it was a tight dam which
would not bypass \V"ater through it (Gardner, R. 12; Tyzack, R. 19; ~ferkley, R. 63 ; Lewis, R. 73 ; E. Hoeft, R.
100; McNaughton, R. 140). The testimony was that no
water went through or over the dam and that it was as
noted above diverted onto the MeN aughton field. On
not overflowing, see also two of defendants' witnesses :
Ed Hoeft (R. 100), who remembered_ it in 1903, nnd
H. Hoeft, who remembered it in 1906 (R. 116).
The court then found: "that said dam has been
maintained across the McNaughton Gulch at all times
since about 1895, except for short periods of time, less
than one year's duration, when the dam has washed out
and subsequently been replaced." On the dam being in
since 1895 we have already set the evidence forth above
(See R. 8, 139-41, 42-43, 88). As to the dam being main13
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tained, see R. 15, 71, 100, 207. At page 71 Merkley said
he had been on MeN aughton lands every year for 40
years and that the dam was always maintained as a
tight dam. Gardner said dam was in all the time he was
in that area (R. 15). Defendants' witness Hoeft said
that dam was washed out occasionally but that it was
always replaced (R. 100).
Finding Number Nine: "That prior to 1900 a network of ditches was constructed on the McNaughton
properties described above from the Carroll Dam'' (R.
5-8, 42, 148, 207) "and the McNaughton Dam located
near the Southeast corner of the West 40 acre tract,
which dam has been mentioned above; that water could
and can be diverted from the MeN aughton Gulch and
could and can be applied to all of the MeN aughton lands
described above except approximately three acres in the
Northwest corner of the West 40 acre tract, and approximately four acres located South of the McNaughton
Gulch on the West 40 acre tract and the waters from the
gulch have been used on said lands since the two dams
referred to were first constructed.'' In addition to the
evidence of the Carroll ditch cited above and the two
ditches to the North and South from the big McNaughton
Dam, !fcNaughton testified that the North ditch went
to the extreme North end of the property (R. 143), that
the ditches now are as they were in 1900 (R. 207; that
except for a small tract in the Northwest corner of the
property and small tract in Southwest corner, the entire
80 acre farm could be irrigated by using the Carroll and
the MeNa ugh ton Dams. He fixed the size of these tracts
14
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at 21;~ acres eaeh (R. 14-!--!6). ''Titness Horrocks corroborated him in this regard (R. 358-9). There is also
eYidence of a diYersion from a third dam near a slaughter
honsl~ which diYerted "\Yater to the North many years
ago (R·. 139, ~9, 7-!).
Finding Number Ten : ''That there is also a wash
or gulch located on the ~IcNaughton land to the North
of the ~I eX a ughton Gulch; that said last mentioned gulch
has no common name; that it runs more or less parallel
to the l\IcX a ugh ton Gulch; that it is not nearly so deep
as the ~IcXaughton.Gulch and begins on the McNaughton
lands near the middle of the West 40 acre tract; that at
the lower end of this North gulch there is a drain ditch
which commences a few feet North of the North gulch
and extends across the East end of the McNaughton
property and empties into the MeN a ughton Gulch; that
the slope of the land is from the North gulch to the McNaughton Gulch so that any water flowing into said drain
ditch will flow into the MeN a ughton Gulch; that said
drain ditch crosses over the most Westerly ditch used
by any of the defendants leading from their upper point
of diversion and said drain ditch empties the water into
the MeN aughton Gulch above all other points of diversion of the defendants from the MeN a ugh ton Gulch.''
(The North gulch is described, R. 142-43, 261. It is also
shown on plaintiffs' Exhibit A and on defendants' Exhibit 1). The drain ditch is also shown on the two exhibits. It was so constructed that it will catch all excess
waters, if any, placed on McNaughton's lands and return
them directly to the McNaughton Gulch (R. 261). This
15
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was noted by the trial court and is noted here because
even if there were sufficient water in the McNaughton
Gulch at McNaughton's big, permanent dam to more
than supply the needs of his lands (which there is not,
R. 101, 152, 29, 221) it could not prejudice these defendants. The excess would be returned by the drain ditch
directly to the gulch. It would return above all of the
defendants' points of diversion except one and it crosses
over that one. The court so found and Exhibits A and]
both show it.
Finding Number Eleven : ''Generally throughout
the length of the gulch along its sides below the line
where the water percolates, there are now cresses and
succulent grasses growing, and at the sites where the
water issues into the gulch, willows have grown up.
There is no evidence that any of these conditions pertained prior to 1886 before canal water was :first applied
in the drainage area, but the evidence is and the court
:finds that the gulch was dry prior to said time.'' MeN aughton said that plants grow in the gulch itself (R.
141) ; Lewis told of gathering water cress ( R. 81) ; and,
of course, the judge viewed the premises after the trial
and as a part of the evidence (R. 386) and the court
observed the cresses and willows in the gulch. As to it
being a dry gulch prior to 1886, see R. 4 and 16 and other
discussion set forth above.
Finding Number Twelve: That in about 1920 some
of the defendants were involved in a quiet title suit to
determine the extent of their rights to the waters of
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nlcX a ugh ton Gulch; that neither the plaintiffs nor their
predecessors "'"ere parties to that suit; that the defendants divert "Tater from the McNaughton Gulch from
three dams located below the last mentioned dam on the
ill eX a ugh ton property; that all of said dams used by
the defendants to divert ":ater from the McNaughton
Gulch were constructed after the dam maintained by the
~lc~ aughtons near the Southeast corner of the West 40
acre tract; that waters percolate and seep into the MeN aughton Gulch below the last mentioned dam maintained by the plaintiffs and flow into said McNaughton
Gulch along its entire length below said McNaughton
Dam and until the MeN a ughton Gulch empties into the
Ashley Central Canal.''

The decree between the defendants was offered at
R. 300. Plaintiffs objected to it for any purpose except
to show defendants' claims as against each other and
defendants' counsel confessed that it would not be binding as to the MeN aughtons. It was admitted in evidence (R. 301) but of course could have had no binding
effect on the plaintiffs who were not parties to that
decree. The three dams used by the defendants and
identified in that decree are the Rudy Dam, the Tyzack
Dam and the Mantle Dam (R. 374, Exhibits 1 and A).
The dams as they occur on the gulch starting upstream
are then as follows : The Carroll Dam, built in 1886 and
used by the plaintiffs (R. 5). There was an old dam
near the corrals on the McNaughton property which
diverted water to the North (R. 139, 29, 74). It was constructed according to McNaughton prior to 1900 (R. 139)

17
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but has not been rec.ently used except for occasional
pumping (R. 144). Then comes the big dam which is
some 20 feet high, 100 feet long and backs water up as
much as 150 yards (R. 20, 218). It had been there a
long time in 1896 according to Gardner (R. 8). Other
witnesses as noted above remembered it as having been
constructed prior to 1900 (R. 19, 43, 74, 139-41, 231).
Then came the Rudy Dam, built by witness Rudy. Rudy
said that the MeN a ugh ton Dam was already in when
he built the Rudy Dam (R. 234). Gardner was Rudy's
stepson. Gardner also said that the Rudy Dam was built
after the McNaughton Dam (R. 10). Ross said that Rudy
Dam and Tyzack Dam were built the same year and with
reference to his marriage in 1907 he fixed the date of
construction as the summer of 1905 (R. 334). Next downstream comes the Tyzack Dam. According to Tyzack,
his father constructed the dam about "midway" of the
period they lived in that area (R. 19). His testimony
was that they moved there in 1900 and left in 1910. At
the time he moved there in 1900, the McNaughton Dam
was in (R. 19). He remembers that the McNaughton
Dam was in place prior to the construction of the Tyzack
Dam (R. 19). The Mantle Dam, according to Tyzack,
~'"as put in after the Tyzack Dam (R. 21). It is to be
remembered that both Rudy and Tyzack· were predecessors in interest of the defendants (R. 18, 11, 12).
No one directly connected with the construction of
the Mantle Dam testified. However, Tyzack said it was
later than the Tyzack Dam (R. 21); Gardner said that
the Mantle Dam went in the same season that the Rudy
18
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Dam 'Yas constructed (R. 12) nnd that both the Rudy
Dam and the niantle Dam 'Yere constructed before the
Tyzark Dam (R. 14). No 'Yitness, except Gardner and
Rudy could remember back far enough to demember
"-hen the :i\IcNaughton Dam "'"ent in. Gardner said he
\Yent s"-imming· in the pond "'"hen he was 16 years old
(1896) and the dam had been there a long time then (R.
8). Rudy said nlcNaughtons were using water and that
he became acquainted there in about 1890-1895 (R. 231).
Several \Yitnesses remembered to about 1900; MeN a ughton (R. 139); Carroll (R. 43); Lewis (R. 73-74). Hoeft
remembers it in 1903 (R. 88). There is no witness who
testified that any one of the defendants' three dams was
in prior to the Carroll Dam or the big MeN aught on Dam.
Ross said at Page 333 that McNaughton Dam was not in
first, but later admitted that he was not sure (R. 334).
In view of all the positive evidence from those who were
active in the construction of the dams and the total lack
of conflicting evidence, the court could not have found
otherwise than that the McNaughton Dam was in first.
As to water coming into the gulch below MeN aughton
Dam, see testimony of Merkley who said 3 to 7 feet
flowed into Ashley Central Canal even though McNaughton kept a tight dam (R. 71).
DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE
The witnesses called by the defendants had very
little knowledge of conditions on the gulch. Defendant
Fisher had never been on the McNaughton place prior
to 1948 when he went looking for the water (R. 292).
19
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Ross lived there and used water for 48 years and never
once went upstream to see what McNaughton was doing
with the water (R. 337). John B. Eaton had used water
from the gulch for 35 years and was never on MeN aughton's property until 1948 when they went looking for
the water (R. 353). Christensen was an engineer who
got his information from an inspection during the trial.
Defendants also called Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft. Mr. Hoeft
said McNaughton Dam was there in 1903 (R. 88) and
that it was a tight dam, not overflowing (R. 100). He
was there only once in 1903 and was not there again
until 1918. Mrs. Hoeft was there first in 1906 and the
MeN a ughton Dam was seen by her. She remembered it
as a tight dam which did not overflow (R. 112, 116).
These are defendants' only witnesses.
The record thus not only supports the trial court~s
findings, but essentially it stands without contradiction.
With the evidence printed so that the court can readily
refer to it, the appellants can gain little by asserting
time, and again throughout their brief that there is no
evidence to support the findings.
ARGUMENT

I.

APPELLANTS HAD A FAIR TRIAL

Throughout appellants' brief it is asserted that the
parties both "proceeded" upon the theory that the
waters in the McNaughton Gulch were subject to public
appropriation. This simply isn't true, and nothing in
the record can be or has been cited by appellants to
20
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demonstrate the correctness of it. Reference to the pleadings "ill show that the plaintiffs simply pleaded in
general terms that they were the owners of the right to
use for irrigation and stock watering purposes the water
arising in the McNaughton Gulch from seepage, percolation, or otherwise, between the Carroll dam and the
big dam described in the Statement of Facts. The pleadings do not state that said claim of ownership wa.s
based upon public appropriation. The basis of that
claim of ownership was not set forth at all (R. 27).
There was no pretrial, no interrogatories were served,
and the case went to trial on the plaintiff's general allegation of ownership. Reference to the transcript of the
evidence fails to show any opening statement by counsel
for the plaintiffs. Therefore, if appellants did rely on
the water being public, they did so without having had
any right to do so.
Further, during the course of the trial, on the second
day, respondents made it clear that they were not admitting that this was a water course. At Page 201 of
the transcript the plaintiff was asked whether or not he
claimed to own this water during the wintertime. The
plaintiff answered that he claimed it for stock watering
purposes and then said, ''I don't want to tie myself
down on this period when the water arises on our property. It is a different position than where you are out
on some other property.'' Counsel for the appellants
then said, ''Well, all of the water rising on your property
arises in the natural water course of the McNaughton
Draw''' Counsel for respondents then made this obSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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jection: "I object to the characterization of it as a water
course, to the form of the question, your Honor, as something that is not in evidence.'' Certainly from this the
appellants should have realized that McNaughton was
claiming that the "\Vater which arose on his property was
not governed by the general law of appropriation.
From the beginning of this case, when the complaint
was :filed, to the end of the trial, there is nothing in the
record which can be pointed to as an admission by the
respondents that they would not rely upon this being
private water. There was a great amount of evidence
directed to the question of the source of the water. If
we had abandoned the private ownership theory, all of
the evidence directed toward the fact that this water had
its origin in private irrigation would have been immaterial.
Further, every witness who testified was exhaustively examined concerning his knowledge of the conditions on the gulch as far back as he could remember. No
witness called could have added anything to the record
in this regard.
At the close of the evidence, when the matter was
argued, the trial judge asked counsel for the plaintiffs
if he thought the doctrine of private ownership could be
sustained. Counsel for the plaintiff confessed that he
did not think so in view of the authorities which will be
discussed in Section 2 hereof, and particularly in view
of the case of Lehi Irrigation Company v. Jones, 202 P.
(2d) 982. It is because of this confession made at the
22
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argu·ment that the trial court noted in its memorandum
decision that both parties had taken "the position that
the "\Yaters in question are public "\Yaters and thus subject
to appropriation'' (R. 40). It should be noted that the
court did not find or comment upon the parties having
'• proceeded'' through the trial on that theory. We therefore assert with full assurance that the record does not
contradict us, that defendants 'Yere not misled.

XO SHOWING ON l\IOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Perhaps the most conclusive thing, however, against
this argument by appellants that they did not have a fair
trial is the fact that upon their filing of a motion for new
trial no affidavits were filed to show that appellants could
have or would have submitted any new or different evidence. Reference to the record will show that the court
handed down its memorandum decision on September 14,
1950 (R. 65). At that time the appellants certainly knew
the theory upon which the case had been decided. There
was a delay from September 14th to September 28th
before the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
prepared and served on the defendants (R. 74). Thereafter, the trial court delayed for nearly a month in signing and entering the findings and the decree (R. 73).
The motion for new trial was filed on November 9th (R.
76) which was nearly two full months after the court's
memorandum decision. The motion for new trial was
not argued until December 8th (R. 82) so that for nearly
three full months the appellants knew that the court
had decided the case on the theory that this water had
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its origin in private irrigation and that it was private
water. They, nevertheless, failed to locate any new
evidence of any kind which would have any materiality
on that issue and offered no affidavits and made no
showing as to how they were prejudiced by the deciding
of the case on that theory.
Appellants say at Page 14 of their brief, ''Who can
say that if the defendants had been advised that there
was some question about the waters in dispute being
subject to appropriation, the defendants could not have
established such fact beyond controversy.'' The law is
that the duty is on them to show at the time the motion
for new trial is heard that they had new evidence and
what it would have been. This court will not presume
that such evidence existed, nor will it presume prejudice.
In this regard, it would not be possible to find a
stronger case in support of our position than the case
of Beckstead v. Brinton, 105 Utah 395, 142 P. (2d) 409.
There the trial court throughout the trial told the parties
that he was following the law of the State of Utah, not
the 0. P. A. regulations; that he was not interested in
the ''slightest'' in whether the respondent in good faith
wanted the premises for his own use. He made the statement not only once but on numerous occasions throughout the trial and thus discouraged counsel from inquiring into that question. Then, without advising counsel
of his change in views, the judge made findings that the
owner in good faith wanted the premises for his own
use. This was claimed to be prejudicial error. No affi24
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daYits "~ere filed in support of the motion for new trial.
The Supreme Court said that it must assume that tbe
trial judge, before making the findings, considered the
eYidence presented. It then said:

''In the absence of a showing on motion for
a new trial that appellants were prejudiced by
the lack of notification, that the court had experienced a change of mind, we must presume that
they were not prejudiced by such failure to be
apprized.''
If in the face of such an emphatic declaration during

the trial as was made in the Bri.nton case, this court will
not assume prejudicial error, certainly it should not
make such an assumption in this case. The duty was
clearly upon the appellants in arguing their motion for
new trial to show the court by affidavit or otherwise
wherein they were prejudiced. When a motion is made,
as this one was, upon the theory that the court surprised
the parties by deciding the case on a theory not argued,
the persons making the motion have an absolute duty
of advising the court as to the evidence which they would
put in if a new trial were granted.
Rule 59 (a) sets forth the groundB upon which a
motion for new trial may be made. The motion made
herein could only conceivably come under grounds 3 or
4. Rule 59(c) expressly requires an application for new
trial based upon sections 3 or 4 to be supported by affidavit. It requires that these affidavits be served with
the motion, and that time be allowed for the opposing
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party to serve opposing affidavits. This rule was completely disregarded by the appellants. They had three
full months after having been notified in court by a
lengthy memorandum opinion as to the court's theory.
They had one month after the findings were served on
them within which to object to the findings and they had
over one month after the decree was entered within which
they could have procured affidavits. They totally ignored Rule 59 and now on appeal their total showing as
to prejudice is to ask the question, "Who can say that
they would not have been able to find evidence if a new
trial had been granted~'' Under the holding of Beckstead v. Brinton, supra, they have utterly failed to show
any prejudice.
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the defendants were not misled. The pleadings of general ownership, the evidence relating to the source of the water,
and the express comments made (R. 201) certainly put
them on notice that the water was claimed to have its
origin in upper irrigation, and that it might be decided
that the McNaughton Gulch was a private water course.
If the court could possibly conclude in the face of the
record that they were misled during the trial and that
they were thus surprised by the trial judge's opinion,
they had a duty to make a showing in support of their
motion for new trial, as required by Rule 59. This they
utterly failed to do. This court, under the authorities,
will not presume that other or different evidence was
available, nor that they were prejudiced.
26
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II.

Drn THE TRIAL CouRT ERR IN FINDING THAT THIS

\\T.-\.S

A PnrV.\TE WATER CouRsE~

The appellants assert that the evidence shows that
this "~as public " . ater subject to appropriation. They
fail to tell the court ho'v such a conclusion, if reached,
'vould help them. \V. e "'ill demonstrate under Point III
hereof, that eV"en if this is public "Tater, the evidence
conclusi,ely shows and the trial court expressly found
that the plaintiffs were prior in time and in right to any
of the defendants. 'V e will address ourself first to the
correctness of the trial court's conclusion that these
\Yaters were private waters, and will then proceed under
Point No. III to demonstrate that even if the court did
err in its conclusion of law, it nevertheless was correct
in its facts and result.
\Ve submit that under the evidence outlined above
the court correctly found that prior to 1885 the McNaughton Gulch was a dry gulch (R. 4 and 16). The
flow of water in the McNaughton Gulch had its origin
in upper irrigation. Gardner testified that in 1885 the
gulch 'vas a dry gulch and that in 1886 there was not
much land being irrigated along the gulch; and that
there was little water in the gulch except canal water
(R. 16). Rudy said that the flow of water in the gulch
increased from year to year (R. 234). Lewis testified
that the flow in the gulch would come after they started
irrigating the farm lands above (R. 82). Carroll said
that there is not much water in the gulch after irrigation
stops (R. 56). Frank Lee said that the gulch carried
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seepage water, and that there was not much seepage in
the wintertime (R. 37). Both Carroll and McNaughton
testified that the stream was made up of seepage water
and waste water from upper irrigation (R. 41 and 158).
The judge observed the premises and the drainage areas
on each side of the McNaughton Gulch. The evidence
was conclusive that the drainage from the irrigA:tted
lands flows into the gulch both on the North and South
side thereof. From this testimony the trial court found
that the water in question had its origin in the irrigation of upper lands.
Since this finding is warranted by the evidence, we
have the question of law as to whether or not this makes
the water private water owned by the person on whose
land it arises. In this regard the trial court has written
a detailed eighteen-page memorandum decision which
analyzes the development of the law in the state of Utah.
We refer the court to the record, page 48, for this decision. We will not attempt here to re-present the trial
court's reasoning. We note only that in the case of
Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co. v. Unio.n Central Life
Ins. Co., et al., 105 U. 468, 142 P. (2d) 866, the court was
dealing with seepage and waste water much as that involved here. The court refused to decide whether or not
waters of this nature were subject to appropriation.
Judge Wolfe noted at page 479 that in the absence of
statute it is generally held that such waste water and
seepage water cannot be appropriated. However, in
that case no one had filed on the water after 1903 and
there was no showing of a diligence right prior to 1903
28
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\Yhen filings 'Yith the State Engineer were not necessary.
The court simply raised the question as to whether or
not these "~a ters could be appropriated.
In the Tl'"rathall v. Johnson, 86 Ut. 50, 40 P. (2d) 755,
the court did say that "~aters which have their origin in
priYate irrigation are not subject to the law of appropriation.
The later case of Riordian v. Westwood, 203 P. (2d)
922, was dealing with water which had its origin in
natural sources, and the trial court here distinguished
that case on that ground. Therefore, at least until the
case of Lehi Irrigation Company v. Jones, 202 P. (2d)
982, this court had never affirmatively stated, as far as
my research reveals, that waters having their origin in
artificial irrigation were subject to public appropriation.
In the case of Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Jones, supra,
everyone conceded that the spring in question had increased in flow because of the fact that upper irrigators
had applied Deer Creek water on Provo Bench._. The
waters left Provo Bench and had found an outlet in a
spring which arose on the ground of Jones. Jones filed
on the water on the theory that it was open to public
appropriation. The Lehi Irrigation Company protested
the filing because it had always used all of the flow from
the spring. The. court affirmed the State Engineer in
approving the application of Jones. In doing this it indicated that such waters were subject to appropriation
after they reach a natural source and commingle with
other waters.
29
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In view of the Jones case, we thought that at least
as against everyone except the irrigators who waste the
water from their land this court had held that the waters
were subject to public appropriation. We, however,
note that there is a distinguishing feature between this
case and the Jones case, in that here the waters found
their way to what had been a dry gulch and never lost
their identity by commingling with water from natural
sources, while in the Jones case the waters found their
way to a natural water course and commingled with
waters which had their origin in natural sources and
thus lost their identity. If this distinction is sound, and
the trial court argues that it is, then the trial judge
should be affirmed upon the basis presented in his memorandum decision.
III.

EVEN IF THE CouRT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
WATERS WERE PRIVATE WATERS, IT NEVERTHELESS
ARRIVED AT A CoRRECT RESULT.

It is well established under the Utah cases that a
trial , court will be affirmed if its decision is right in
result, even though the wrong reason is stated for it.
There are many cases so holding, but a very recent one
is the case of Tree v. White, 110 Utah 233, 171 P. (2d)
398. The court says :
'' 'A decision right in result will not be reversed even though the reason stated for it is
wrong. 3 Am. Jur., p. 563.'
'See also Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. Chicago,
352 Ill. 11, 185 N. E. 170, 87 A. L. R. 742 and 3 Am.
Jur. p. 367, Sec. 825.'
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·The appellant may not preY ail unless there
has been error in the result as well as error In
the reasoning.' "
The appellants here simply argue that the trial
court erred in reasoning that the waters in question
'Yere priYate 'vaters. They urge that the court should
have found that the "\Vaters 'vere public waters subject
to appropriation. They then neglect to proceed to tell
the court what conclusion the trial court would have
been compelled to reach from its findings of fact had it
concluded that these were public waters.
The trial court found in favor of plaintiffs on every
issue of fact necessary to establish a prior appropriation. The e\'idence is uncontradicted that the Carroll
Dam was the first diversion on the MeN a ugh ton Gulch,
that the MeN a ughton Dam was second, and that both
were constructed prior to 1895. It is also uncontradicted
that both dams were built prior to any of the defendant's
dams (R. 10, 19, 21, 43, 74, 139, 234). Plaintiffs diverted
all of the water which came down to those dams because
the lower dam was a permanent, tight dam (R. 12, 15,
19, 63, 73, 100, 140); all of the waters thus diverted were
necessary to irrigate the 80 acre farm (R. 29, 101, 221)
and at times it was necessary to augment these waters
with canal waters (R. 152). The diversion by plaintiffs
was made prior to 1903, when water could be appropriated in Utah simply by diversion and use. See Wellsville-East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock, 104 Utah 448, 137 P. (2d) 634. The court from the
evidence so found on each of these issues of fact. This
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conclusively shows a prior appropriation by the plaintiffs superior to the right of any of the defendants. It
is thus clear that had the court concluded that these
waters were subject to prior appropriation, then from
its findings on these issues it would have been compelled
to enter the decree which was in fact entered. The plaintiffs had made a prior appropriation of all .of the water
aceumulating in the gulch at the Carroll Dam and at
the MeN a ughton Dam. The dams had been maintained
continuously since 1895 and all of the defendants admitted, as is shown by the Statement of Facts, that they
had never in the 48 years prior to 1948 attempted to
interfere with these permanent dams.
It is then obvious that if these waters having their
origin in upper artificial irrigation were private waters,
they belonged to the McNaught.ons because they arose
on the McNaughton lands and he used them for 50 years.
If the court is wrong in its conclusion of law as to the
nature of these waters, then the facts as found, conclusively show that the McNaughtons made the first valid
appropriaiton. In fact, there is little evidence from
which the trial court could have found that any of the
defendants, or their predecessors, diverted any water
from the gulch prior to 1905. From 1905 forward it
has never been possible to appropriate water from surface streams by usage alone and there is no evidence
that any of the defendants made filings with the State
Engineer. We, therefore, seriously question that these
defendants have any water rights. Tyzack placed the
construction .of the defendants' dams as midway in the
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period \Yhen he and his family liYed in that area. He
tl•stified that they moved there in 1900 and moved away
in 1910 ( R. 19). He also testified that the dams were
not constructed until after his parents acquired the land
\Yhich they farmed, and the record shows without contradiction that Tyzack's Father acquired the land in
October of 1905 (R. 355). Mr. Ross testified that the
dams were put in just two years before his marriage and
he \Yas married in 1907 (R. 334). It is, therefore, extremely doubtful that the defendants have any water
rights. They are located downstream from the plaintiff
so that they could not have acquired a right by adverse
use. (See TVellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay
Land & Livestock, supra). The evidence does not show
a diversion prior to 1903, and certainly after 1903 they
would have been required to file to initiate a water right.
(See rv· ellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lin.dsatJ
Land & Livestock, supra, Duchesne County v. Humphries,
106 Utah 332, 148 P. (2d) 338, Smith v. S(};(Ybders, 189 P.
(2d) 701.
The appellants assert that the court must disregard
the findings of fact made by the trial court which are
material only to the theory of prior appropriation. This
court will never assume that the trial court made findings
without considering the evidence. (See Beckstead v.
Brinton, 105 Utah 395, 142 P. (2d) 409, Gordon v. Murray City, 151 P. (2d) 193, 106 Utah, 583). Thus the
court's findings and the evidence both require the affirmance of this decree, regardless of which theory of the
law the court adopts as being correct. If it is private
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water, plaintiffs win because it arises on their lands. If
it is public water, they made the only valid appropriation and have used the water, unmolested, for half a
century.

IV.

THE APPELLANTS HAvE NoT BEEN PREJUDICED.

It must be remembered that under the uncontradicted evidence the McNaughtons have maintained a
tight dam across the McNaughton Gulch above the points
of diversion used by the defendants since at least 1895
(R. 12, 15, 19, 63, 73, 100, 140). Rudy and Tyzack, 'vho
were predecessors in inter~st of the defendants, readily
acknowledge that the MeN a ughton Dam was in ahead of
the defendants' dams (R. 19, 2, 34), and according to
MeN a ugh ton in all of the years from 1900 to 1948 there
had never been any trouble on the stream (R. 183).
Ed Hoft, a predecessor in interest to one of defendants, acknowledged that the McNaughton Dam was
a tight dam and that it did not overflow (R. 100); and
that from 1919 until he sold the property he never had
occasion to disturb the McNaughton Dam (R. 102).
Ernest Johnson owned part of the defendants' lands and
he said that he never bothered to walk upstream during
the time he farmed the lands (R. 125). Mr. Ross, who
was a predecessor in interest to some of the defendants,
was on the stream for 48 years, and he never once
had occasion to go upstream to the McNaughton farm
(R. 33). John B. Eaton has farmed some of defendant's
property for 35 years, and he never during all of that
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time had occasion to go to the McNaughton property
until1948 'Yhen this trouble started (R. 353).
It is thus clear that for half a century the McNaughtons haYe maintained a tight dam and have diverted all
the water from the gulch and applied it to the irrigation
of their lands. The dam "\Vashed out in 1947 (R. 375).
It "~as replaced in 1948 and 1949 (R. 171) and of course
when it was replaced the water was shut off. Fisher,
who had just become an owner of land on the gulch (R.
275) missed the water and went upstream to find it (R.
276, 293). He saw the dams and ditches of McNaughton.
The dam had been recently replaced and the ditches had
been recently cleaned. Fisher thought the dam and
ditches were new construction (R. 281, 287). He took
his shovel and diverted the water out of the :1\tfcNaughton
ditches (R. 294) and then had McNaughton arrested. The
defendants selected as their attorney Hugh B. Colton,
who was at that time County Attorney, and rather than
bring a civil action, they used the criminal law ( R. 159).
Threatened with further criminal prosecution for using
the water as he had done for half a century, McNaughton
brought this suit to quiet title against the claims of the
defendants. He was upstream from all of them. He has
used the water in question for at least 50 years openly,
notoriously, continuously, adversely and under claim of
right; for fifty years his use had never been challenged.
During practically all of the 50 year period (until 1939)
water rights could be acquired by adverse use. Wells...,
ville-East Field Irrigation Company v. Lindsay Land &
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Livestock Company, 104 Utah 448, 137 P. (2d) 634. The
defendants are thus in the position of attempting to upset
the established usage which has prevailed for all these
years and which has been known by their predecessors
to have existed. There is not one word of testimony in
the record that the amount of water diverted by the
McNaughtons is in excess of the needs of their land. The
only evidence relating to the need of water is that adduced by the plaintiffs, and it is all to the effect that the
water diverted has all been necessary, that it all can be
retained on the MeN aughton land, and that at times it
is inadequate so that canal water must be commingled
with it (R. 29, 221, 101, 152).

The flow of water in the McNaughton Gulch is
variable. When farmers upstream permit their waste
water to run uncontrolled into the gulch there may be
substantial quantities of water present (R. 52, 158). By
impounding the same behind this large dam, which is
20 feet high, 100 feet long, and will back the water along
the channel for 150 yards, MeN a ughton can control the
size of irrigation stream for the irrigation of his farm.
It would be almost impossible to divide the use of the
water into definite hours per week or per day, because
the amount of water in the gulch is so variable. One day
there may be large quantities of water because of the
irrigation practices followed upstream and on the next
day there may be very little water. The dam which the
· McNaughtons maintain is a permanent dirt-filled dam,
not adapted to removal and replacement.
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The court should also note Exhibits 1 and A, and
the reeord at Pag-es ~61-2 relating to the existence of a
drain ditch on the bottom (east) end of the McNaughton
farm. The ~lcNaughton lands straddle the gulch. On
each side of the gulch the land slopes toward the gulch,
in addition to sloping generally to the east. Across the
entire east end of the ~lcNaughton property is a drain
ditch which will intercept every bit of water which would
otherwise run off the MeN aughton land to the east (R.
261, ~6~). Therefore, if any excess water were applied
to the ~le~aughton lands,- it would either find its way
directly back into the gulch or would find its way to the
drain ditch on the east end of the MeN aught.on property
which would return the water directly to the gulch at a
point above two of the points of diversion used by the
defendants. The third point of diversion, which is above
the drain ditch, crosses the drain ditch and the water
from the drain ditch could be very easily diverted into
the first ditch of the defendants, the trial court so found
(Finding No. 10, page 70). It would, therefore, be
physically impossible for McNaughton to divert the
water away from these defendants or to hold it away
from them.
This is an important consideration. See Sharp v.
Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 168 P. 273, where the quantity of
water awarded to Whitmore was increased by the
Supreme Court from four feet to five feet. The lands
sloped directly to the creek and any excess water would
be returned to the creek ahead of the plaintiffs' point
of diversion. The stream varied greatly as to the quanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tity of water available. Justice Frick noted particularly
that in increasing the quantity of water above that
awarded by the trial court no possible injury could be
done to the downstream users. If Whitmore were limited
to less water than he had used in the past he might suffer
irreparable injury, but if too much water were applied
to the Whitmore lands, it would find its way directly
back to the stream and be available for downstream
users. Such is the condition which prevails here. There
is not one word of evidence to the effect that MeN aughton has been diverting more water than he needs, but
to the contrary, the evidence is that there was not sufficient water in the gulch even to meet his needs (R. 29,
101, 152, 221). Even were there too much water diverted,
it could not injure the appellants because the slope of
the lands and the location of the defendants' points of
diversion are such that any excess water must be returned directly to the channel and be thus available to
the defendants.

V.

THE CouRT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE RuDY DEPOSITION

Since the Rudy deposition is for the most part only
corroborating other uncontradicted evidence, it probably
is not too material whether the court committed error in
admitting the deposition. It was admittedly inadmissable
as against some of these defendants anyway, because
they were not given notice, nor even thought of as being
parties to this suit at the time the deposition was taken.
The only contention concerning the deposition is that
the judge in fixing the order for the taking of the deposi·
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tion did not name the clerk of the court to 'vhom the
deposition should be returned. It is correct that the
court did not so proYide, but in vie"T of that fact that
notice of the taking of the deposition was properly
serYed upon fiye of the defendants and the deposition
'vas actually returned to the clerk of the District Court,
it is difficult to see how the defendants were prejudiced.
Xo authority is cited by the appellant for their assertion
that this 'vas prejudicial error. The new rules (Rule 27)
do not contain a like provision, and we have been unable
to find any authority indicating that the failure of the
.court to specify the place where the deposition should
be sent is too material. It should also be noted that the
petition was filed in the District Court of Uintah County,
and that both the order and the notice of hearing were
entitled in that court. There is no material finding of
fact which is dependent alone upon Rudy's testimony,
and we submit that the court committed no error in admitting it.

VI.

FINDING No.

2 SHoULD

BE CoRRECTED

Finding No. 2 entered by the trial court recites that
additional parties were added to the case by stipulation.
Reference to the Record 227-8 will show that there were
additional parties who entered their appearance who
were not covered by said finding. The following names
should be added to the finding: Jack Turner, and Marie
L. Turner; W. S. Ross and Fern Ross Faucett, and
Myron D. Perry. These persons all entered their appearance and of course are bound by the judgment. I-Io,vSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ever, the transcript may eventually be unavailable and
the judgment and decree should show the names of these
additional parties. This court should in its opinion
direct the trial court to add these additional defendants
in Finding No. 2.
It is respectfully submitted that the action of the
trial judge should be affirmed.

EDWARD W. CLYDE
Attorney for Respondents
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